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ABSTRACT 
 
Sniffing is one of the most prominent causes for most of the attacks in the digitized computing environment. 
Through various packet analyzers or sniffers available free of cost, the network packets can be captured 
and analyzed. The sensitive information of the victim like user credentials, passwords, a PIN which is of 
more considerable interest to the assailants’  can be stolen through sniffers. This is the primary reason for 
most of the variations of DDoS attacks in the network from a variety of its catalog of attacks. An effective 
and trusted framework for detecting and preventing these sniffing has greater significance in today’s 
computing. A counter hack method to avoid data theft is to encrypt sensitive information. This paper 
provides an analysis of the most prominent sniffing attacks. Moreover, this is one of the most important 
strides to guarantee system security. Also, a Lattice structure has been derived to prove that sniffing is the 
prominent activity for DoS or DDoS attacks. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The most malicious case for DDoS [1] attacks is the sniffing which can be implemented by tools 
or can be done manually for attacking the victim system. The attacks caused by this process is 
called sniffing attacks and fully automated tool used is named as sniffer or packet analyzer. These 
sniffing attacks are one of the causes of DDoS attacks. Most of the sniffing attacks are involved 
in capturing sensitive information/data like user credentials, password, secret codes, PIN, and so 
on. Sniffer performs its operations in two modes, namely promiscuous and not- promiscuous. In 
the former one, the sniffer can pilfer information from all the devices connected to the network 
and in the later one, only the information going to and from its host system.  Based on the type of 
information stealth and ways it performs the sniffing, it has broad classification as shown in 
Figure 1. Sniffing attack can be in two ways Active sniffing and passive sniffing. The former one 
can be detected where the attacker can sniff the traffic in the network, whereas the later one is 
difficult to detect but can be prevented [2]. Also, B. Prabadevi and N. Jeyanthi [2] present some 
of the active sniffing tools used to sniff the data via a network for launching various attacks in the 
network and anti sniffer tools.  
 
Usually, these DDoS attacks can be caused by an individual or an attacker with the help of some 
handlers or agents/zombies responding to an attacker’s command to exploit the victims. In the  
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latter case, the attacker sends the command holding the victim’s information and attack type to 
the handlers who will direct the zombies to propagate these camouflaged data packets to the 
victim’s system. Here the victim can be a single host or a link termed as destination flooding and 
link flooding respectively. This process seems to be simple but causes a devasting effect without 
getting caught quickly, by making use of zombies through spoofing, and the sources are also 
distributed. This may either consume more bandwidth by exploiting the resources or crashes the 
entire system itself. This forms the basis for various forms of attacks on the internet. The 
vulnerabilities caused by DDoS attacks are growing tremendously from 171 in 1995, 7236 in 
2007, 6058 in 2008, CERT investigated 130, 165 DDoS reports in 2013 and 2014. Especially in 
Lithuania CERT identified 2000 computers/ day were remotely accessed without owners’ 
knowledge and 2500 computers/day in 2015 (CERT statistics) [3]. Akamai suggests DDoS 
attacked peaked at 300 GBPS in 2013and 400 Gbps in 2014, which had put 160,000 users offline 
for about multiple hours [4].  Most of the DDoS attacks go unreported. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Classification of sniffing based on various scenarios 
 
An adequate infrastructure with different levels of encryption must be provided, to overcome 
these attacks. The detection of these attacks remains to be challenging one than prevention.  Most 
of the computing technologies hold both sensitive and non-sensitive data. Armor for segregating 
sensitive information from non-sensitive information with authentication at multiple levels is 
needed, which makes it difficult for the cyber antagonist to gain access to sensitive information. 
This helps the organization to overcome the issues with Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) 
programs. This analysis will help in developing a better system. Anu S and Vimala have surveyed 
various sniffing attacks, namely MAC flooding, ARP poisoning, DHCP attacks, DNS poisoning, 
password sniffing and presented brief steps for carrying out these attacks [5]. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
 
Defense Mechanisms against DDoS attacks, in particular, the sniffing attacks are an emerging 
research issue. Researchers have proposed and implemented many Intrusion Detection/Prevention 
Systems (IDS/IPS) to avoid the variants of DDoS attacks. The sniffing is the prominent reason for 
most of the web attacks and specifically DDoS attacks.  A survey on intrusion detection practices 
that are most commonly used viz., IDS using SVM (Support Vector Machine),   GA (Genetic 
Algorithm), and a cross-layer protocol for DDoS attacks in the sensor nodes was done, and 
performance of the various classifier was evaluated [6].  A comparative review on service 
disruptions by DDoS attacks over the internet stated that it is possible to completely stop the 
DDoS attacks by enhancing the QoS (Quality of Service) of Intrusion forbearance tools [7]. 
Barth A et al., have done a broad survey on various algorithms for content sniffing used by most 
popular browsers like Chrome, IE, and so [8]. They have proposed an algorithm to alleviate 
against the attacks they have encountered through their analysis of content sniffing algorithms 
with web filters. They were specifically concerned to avoid papers from a look back over 
themselves. To ensure maximum compatibility and security, they used two principles, namely 
avoiding privilege escalation and Using prefix disjoint signatures. 
 
Barua et al.,[9]  implemented an approach to detect and prevent the content sniffing attacks. They 
have used the scripting language parsers to analyze the content of the files uploaded through 
websites and evaluated the results by examining with a suite consisting of both malicious files 
and benign files. Content sniffing attacks were detected by encrypting the files using Private Key 
cryptography and by using a file splitter technique [10]. A tag bit generated by the MD5 
algorithm is used to check for the modification in the files.  
 
Prerna Arote and Karam Veer Arya proposed a technique using a central server (CS) concept and 
voting to detect and prevent the ARP poisoning attack. CS will sniff the traffic over the network 
and sends trap ICMP ping packets to analyze the ICMP replies. By this, it can successfully detect 
the intruders [11]. To prevent the Central server from attack, they employed the voting process to 
designate a candid server as CS. 
 
Using the Gratuitous ARP Decision packet System (GDPS), Salim, H et al. proposed a solution to 
prevent the ARP spoofing attacks [12]. They have compared the performance of the system with 
normal ARP packets. GDPS system performs the real-time traffic analysis of the interested hosts, 
and for the received anomalous ARP packets by analysis, a GDP packet is sent for prevention. In 
this packet, the source address is set to 0.0.0.0 and the mode of transfer is set to uncast.  
 
A Probe packet based technique with enhanced spoof detection engine was used by Poonam 
Pandey to prevent the ARP cache poisoning attacks [13]. It uses the verifier table and handler 
algorithm to detect the attacker. ARP-ICMP probe packets were used to detect the ARP spoofing 
for identifying the legitimate IP-MAC pair. 
 
Attackers launch various attacks like MITM attacks, DoS attacks, cloning attacks through ARP 
spoofing. Imtiyaz Ahmad lone and Md. Ataullah had done a broad survey on various mitigation 
techniques against ARP sniffing attacks with their merits and demerits [14]. Anubhi Kulshrestha 
and Sanjay Kumar Dubey analyzed and reviewed various types of sniffing attacks and concluded 
that sniffing is the most susceptible attack in browsing. Anubhi Kulshrestha and Sanjay Kumar 
Dubey had discussed various attack types like password sniffing, content sniffing and phishing 
attack with the ways to overcome those attacks [15]. 
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Abdul Nasir et al. proposed an intelligent approach for detecting sniffing attacks [16]. This 
technique is used to detect the active and passive sniffing attack by determining the nature of the 
network spontaneously. This technique invokes ARP based detection or IP-packet routing based 
detection if the nature of networking is broadcast or non-broadcast, respectively. 
 
Tasnuva et al., done a systematic analysis of DDoS attacks and its various mitigation technique 
[17]. They illustrated the various phases of DDoS attacks, identified the features of various DDoS 
attacks and surveyed the various websites affected by DDoS launch. They had shown that the size 
of DDoS attacks for the years 2007 to 2016, which was tremendous in 2016 and the frequency of 
occurrence is also more [18]. They conclude some more new attacks are rising whose features are 
not predictable. They have concluded stating that DDoS has a greater impact on non-conventional 
domains like cloud, Big data, smart grids, and IoT.  
 
Arbor WISR annual report states that the security loopholes in IoT devices and botnets have 
paved the way for the attackers to launch massive attacks based on immense growth in attack size 
and frequency recorded from 2007 to 2016. It suggests that DDoS mitigation should be the top 
priority for any organization [19]. 13th NETSCOUT Arbor annual report states that there were 
more than 100+ attacks recorded by 13% of respondents in 2017. It states 41% of Academic 
government and enterprises had experienced DDoS attacks[20] while the 14th annual report states 
91% of enterprises’ network bandwidth were completely saturate by DDoS attacks as its size was 
1.7Tbps [21]. 
 
3. CONTENT SNIFFING AND ARP ATTACKS 
 
Of various sniffing attacks, the attacks concerned with ARP based sniffing and content sniffing 
was considered for this analysis and the effect of attacks were analyzed using a lattice structure. 
 
3.1. Content Sniffing Attacks 
 
According to [21], the content sniffing is a tactic of construing the file types or sniffs the sensitive 
content from the file. It can be performed on both server side and client side of the web 
application. Since it is involved in detecting the file formats, content sniffing is also known as 
Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension (MIME) sniffing [22]. In this method, the attacker gains the 
information and intentionally uploads files with illicit contents. Though illicit, these files look like 
genuine one of the MIME types specified.  These payloads may cause Phishing attacks, Cross-site 
scripting (XSS) attacks, and SQL injection attacks, which are the variants of DDoS attacks [1].  
  
3.1.1 Phishing Attacks 
 
A variant of content sniffing is Phishing attacks, which means an e-mail fraud method of 
sniveling sensitive information. The perpetrator gains access to the information by sending an e-
mail which apes the legitimate e-mail and gains the details of the recipients. These emails appear 
to be from trustworthy sites [23]. Consequently, Ford et al., proposed a tool for detecting the flash 
advertisements that leads to malicious behaviour in dynamic web content [24]. It works on both 
static and dynamic nature. 
 
This phishing is not only meant for email, but it can also clone any of the social networking sites 
like Twitter, Facebook and pretends one to enter the credentials. The phishing can also be through 
phone, Search engines; Trojan affected hosts, instant messaging, trustworthy sites, individuals or 
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specific company, and so [25, 26]. These types of Phishing attacks are depicted in Figure 2. 
Several approaches for detecting and preventing phishing attacks are available. Hossain Shahriar 
and Mohammad Zulkernine had done a comparative analysis of various techniques, websites 
affected and proposed a new automatic detector Phish Tester [27]. 
 
 
Figure 2. Types of phishing attacks 
 
3.1.2 Cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks 
 
XSS vulnerabilities arise when the web pages are not sustained carefully from the attacks. With 
this loophole, the attackers inject haphazard JavaScript or HTML code which the browsers 
execute [22]. By this exploitation, the attackers can gain access to the sensitive information 
entered by users through web pages. By 2011, 60% of websites were vulnerable to these XSS 
attacks [27], and over 100 million websites (inclusive of famous websites too) were vulnerable to 
this. The Type- I and Type-II XSS attacks are carried out by persistently storing the inserted 
script in target servers to attack the victim when here retrieves the stored information from the 
servers and with the later one the inserted script is reflected off the web server to attack the victim 
when he clicks the malicious link. Gebre et al., state that content sniffing XSS attacks occur when 
the content sniffing algorithm of browser and website’s differs, the attacker can plinth XSS on 
page visitor [28] as shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. XSS attack by exploiting the mismatch content sniffing algorithms 
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Similar to [28], Barth et al., explained how the attack mounts the XSS vulnerabilities to 
Wikipedia by embedding HTML code into GIF called as GIF/HTML chameleon, in turn, the 
browser treats it as HTML file and runs the script [8] and implemented a new technique to detect 
XSS. 
 
3.1.3 SQL Injection Attacks 
 
An SQL injection is the most hazardous on; it stood first of all vulnerabilities whereas XSS at 
position 3. SQL injection takes place by inserting malicious SQL statements into the SQL query. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Malicious SQL query 
 
The queries mentioned in Figure 4 give the same results, i.e. both retrieves the student's id, name, 
password of all students in the database as the condition 1=1 is true always. When the SQL 
injection query results are not visible to the user, then it is blind SQL injection. To mitigate these 
attacks, parameterized statements can be used. Sadeghian et al., classify SQL injection attacks 
under seven major categories which are cause for these attacks [29]. They derived a taxonomy of 
SQL injection attacks’ mitigation mechanisms, which includes detection and prevention 
techniques adopted by various researchers [14]. 
 
3.2. ARP Attacks 
 
Address Resolution Protocol is used for mapping the IP address (network-layer address) of a host 
to its corresponding MAC address (link-layer address). Any host willing to know the MAC 
address of another host can avail this facility from ARP request-response protocol. ARP has other 
functionality of which is used for updating a host’s changed address in other hosts’ ARP table’s 
cache entries, in simpler terms, it is used just for announcements. This announcement is called a 
gratuitous ARP message. Moreover, it is a stateless protocol which makes entry of all hosts 
without cross-checking it. Because of this nature, it is vulnerable to attacks such as ARP cache 
forging which in turn causes the MITM, cloning, DoS and broadcast attacks [14]. The attacks 
above are active. The passive of ARP attacks is ARP sniffing attack, which will gather sensitive 
information by observing the packets transmitted. 
 
3.2.1. ARP Cache forging 
 
ARP’s subtle fault was noticed after it was drafted. It does not enforce any authentication policies 
for the communicating entities. This paves the way for the attacker to falsify an ARP message 
with malicious content for poisoning the ARP-cache of the victim’s host. This is also termed as 
cache poisoning. It just broadcast the ARP-request message with IP address to all the hosts in the 
network to respond with MAC address. So any intruder can make use of this to make a false entry 
of IP-MAC pair into the victim’s table, in turn, the victim will send all the packets to the 
attacker’s MAC address received in the unicast ARP - response message.  This attack scenario is 
depicted in Figure 5. This forms a variant of MITM attacks. 
 
SELECT  * FROM Students WHERE Id = 51 or 1=1 
SELECT Id, name, Pwd FROM Students WHERE Id = 51 or 1=1 
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Abhishek Samvedi and Sparsh Owlak had implemented a secure ARP to combat this forging or 
spoofing [30]. The forged replies specified in the above figure are called as spoofed ARP 
responses. This type of spoofing can occur at destination, source or victims network traffic. 
 
3.2.2. Broadcast attacks 
 
The attacker sends a numerous Ping or ICMP echo request traffic to all IP address in the 
broadcast list with the spoofed source IP address of the victim. By this the attacker generates 
required packets with victim’s source IP address, consequently sends a sequence packets to any 
organization with a large number of computers ( to a broadcast address), which in turn is 
broadcasted to all hosts in the network. Subsequently, the hosts connected to the network will 
flood the organization with responsibility to the packet sent [12]. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. ARP cache Forging 
 
3.2.3. Cookie or Session hijacking 
 
In this type of attack, the attacker will sniff the session id of TCP socket connection between two 
hosts, and by inserting a spoofed packet, he takes control over the connection. In this scenario, it 
makes the entities to believe the attacker as a trusted server or client. This takes place actively and 
passively. In the later part, the attacker hijacks the session and records all the traffic passing over 
it. Various mitigation methods against this attack are specified [14], which includes static entry 
and some tools. 
 
3.2.4. Cloning of IP and MAC addresses   
 
The attacker, with the knowledge of the victim’s unique IP and MAC addresses, can use that to 
his computer. Now the all packets or frames will be received by the attacker [12]. 
 
4. LATTICE STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 
 
This section provides an analysis of various attacks caused by content sniffing and ARP attacks, 
to ensure that sniffing is the prominent activity for DoS or DDoS attacks. A lattice structure can 
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be obtained, proving that these attacks either directly or indirectly cause the DoS or DDoS 
attacks. 
 
Lattice (L, ≤) is defined as a partially ordered set in which any two elements X and Y has both 
LUB (lowest-upper-bound) and GLB (greatest-lower-bound). Lattice to be a partially ordered set, 
it must satisfy the properties viz., reflexive, antisymmetric and transitivity [31]. 
 
4.1. Purpose of analysis using lattice structure 
 
The lattice structure gives the intricate relationship between the elements participating in the 
structure. In this context, the attacks taken for analysis are either directly or indirectly connected 
to each other (most probably indirectly connected). To be in the lattice, it must be a partially 
ordered set (POSET), where each element must have upper bounds and lower bounds. This 
characteristic of lattice provides a solution for how these attacks are related. 
 
4.2. Lattice Structure 
 
The lattice structure depicted in Figure 6 is a lattice since all the elements have LUB and GLB, 
satisfies the properties of a partially ordered set. The elements in the lattice structure L are 
Sniffing (S), Content Sniffing (CS), ARP Sniffing (AS), Broadcast Attacks (BA), Phishing 
Attacks (PA), ARP Cache Poisoning (CP), DoS (Denial of Service), and DDoS (Distributed 
Denial of Service). 
 
4.2.1. Assumptions 
 
The Lattice L is the POSET defined s: L= {S, CS, AS, BA, PA, CP, DoS, DDoS}; The relation 
“≤” is defined over L.  
 
Let X and Y be the element of the lattice and these elements denote the attacks. Then X≤Y (the 
element X is related to the element Y) if and only if, X causes Y. X and Y are related if X causes 
Y either directly or indirectly. E.g., Sniffing attack and DDoS are related if and only if Sniffing 
attack causes DDoS attack either directly or indirectly. 
 
The elements in partially ordered set ‘L’ on the relation ≤, should satisfy the reflexive, anti-
symmetric and transitivity properties defined as: 
 
• Reflexivity: L is reflexive on relation ≤ if and only if every element of L is related to 
itself  Eg: X ≤ X and it should hold for all the elements of L 
• Anti-symmetric: L is anti-symmetric on relation ≤ if and only if  for every element l1 and 
l2 in L, l1 ≤ l2  and  l2≤l1 
• Transitivity: L on ≤ is transitive when l1∈ L, l2 ∈ L and l3 ∈L, if l1 ≤ l2, l2 ≤ l3 the l1 ≤ 
l3 holds. 
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Figure 6. Structure of Lattice (L,≤ ) 
 
These are the elements of POSET under relation “≤” as it is undeniable from the survey made that 
they satisfy the reflexive, anti-symmetric and transitivity properties. 
CS And AS 
LUB (CS, AS): 
  CS + AS  
  BA 
Here CS ≤ BA, because only by sniffing the contents of the IP or MAC details BA will happen. 
Also AS ≤ BA, since the content sniffed are from ARP table. CS and AS have other UB, but the 
least is BA. 
GLB (CS, AS): 
 CS * AS 
 S 
Here S is the greatest lower bound of CS and AS because it is a process which causes both CS 
and AS 
P and CP 
LUB (P, CP): 
  P + CP 
 DoS 
Here P ≤ DoS, as one of the types of phishing, namely phone phishing which makes un-wanted 
calls or messages to the customers impersonating the actual service provider by fake calls. 
Moreover, ARP cache poisoning makes false entries in the victim's table, consequently makes the 
victim deny his services to legitimate users. Therefore, CP ≤ DoS are related. P and CP have 
other UB, but the least is DoS. 
GLB (P, CP): 
  P * CP 
  CS 
Here CS is the greatest lower bound of P and CP because CS is the preliminary activity for these 
two attacks. 
CP and DoS 
LUB (CP, DoS): 
  CP + DoS 
 DoS 
Here CP ≤ DoS, as one of the major reason for the variant of DoS attacks by ARP spoofing is CP. 
As DoS is self-exhaustive, DoS ≤ DoS. Therefore, the least upper bound of CP and DoS is DoS. 
GLB (CP, DoS): 
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 CP * DoS 
 CS 
Here CS is the greatest lower bound of CP and DoS because CS is the preliminary activity for 
these two attacks. 
DoS and DDoS 
LUB (DoS, DDoS): 
  DoS + DDoS 
 DDoS 
Here DoS ≤ DDoS, because DDoS attacks are the most prominent variants of DoS attacks. 
Consequently, DDoS ≤ DoS since DDoS compromises the individual nodes to act as agents, thus 
denying their services to their legitimate users.  
 GLB (DoS, DDoS): 
  DDoS * DoS 
  S 
 
 
Here S is the greatest lower bound of DDoS and DoS because S is the preliminary activity for 
these two attacks. 
 
 
Hence it can be concluded that this Lattice (L, ≤) is also a bounded lattice with the bounds are [S, 
DDoS]. Because S is the process without which these attacks have no role to play as well DDoS 
is the making possible greatest devastating effects of all the elements or attacks or activities in the 
POSET. 
 
4.3. Application of lattice structure 
 
This lattice model can be used to perform the following: 
 
• To validate any Solution for DoS attacks by checking whether the system mitigates all 
the attack elements in the lattice. 
• Helps to test the mitigation system against possible attack scenarios like: “If Phishing 
attack is detected by a mitigation technique, will this technique also detect DoS attack?” 
• By using this, we can compile the relation between various attacks detected or prevented 
and can trace out the cause for each attack type, devastated victim resources. 
 
 The following Cross-Layer Consistency Checking (CLCC) technique by B.Prabadevi and 
N.Jeyanthi can mitigate ARP sniffing attacks [32]. CLCC is evaluated using the lattice model. 
The system consists of the following components: Packet analysis, ARP cache updating, fake list 
updation and generation of broadcast Alert Message. The packet analysis component determines 
the correct ARP packet depending on the opcode, if the opcode is 1 it is ARP Request, if 2 it is 
ARP Reply, if 25 it is broadcast Alert message and if 26 it is a unicast alert message to the router.  
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Figure 7. A mitigation technique for ARP Cache poisoning attack 
 
The system illustrated in Figure 7 works as follows: 
 
 
 
 
At Router 
Assumptions: Router has received a unicast alert message 
Variables: arp_IPA, arp_MACA, arp_IPR, arp_MACR, Eth_MACA, 
Eth_MACR 
Step: 1 
If(opcode==26)Then // Unicast Alert Message 
       If (arp_IPR==IPR) Then 
               If (arp_MACA==Eth_MACA)Then 
          If (arp_IPA && arp_MACA exists in Router cache) Then 
  Accept Alert; 
          Else 
  Add (arp_IPA, arp_MACA) to fake list; 
  Ignore Alert; 
                Else 
  Ignore Packet and add to fake list; 
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4.4.1. Evaluation of the proposed Algorithm 
 
The proposed method is evaluated by computing the complexity of the algorithm. The algorithm 
performs a cross-layer check(ARP and Ethernet layers) before processing ARP reply or Request 
packets done in fixed number steps: O(1) since the values are constant. It has two new messages 
apart from two messages in the traditional method and maintains a fake list which is updated for 
each forged entry found. This entry is scanned once for each forged entry and if a match found the 
broadcast message is generated. Consider the entries in the fake list is initially empty but in worst 
case ‘k’ entries. Then this scan incurs O (k) and a sequential scan for each ARP Reply – Request 
message incurs O (j) if it has j entries. Since the cache is cleared for every 10 minutes, this 
complexity may vary depending on the hosts in the network. O (1) for each comparison done 
before generating reply and updating fake entries. On the worst case, the total complexity will not 
be more than O (j) + O (k) +scanning cost. In the best case, it may be lesser than several hosts in 
the network.  
 
Table 1 compares the proposed algorithm with existing techniques RFC 826 [33], SARP [34], 
TARP [35], EARP [36] and Central Server Approach [37]. Though the proposed system performs 
Working Procedure: 
Variables: arp_IPA, arp_IPD, arp_MACA, arp_MACD, Eth_MACA,,Eth_MACD. 
When host A wants to know host D’s MAC : 
// sender arp_IPA, arp_MACA and Eth_MACA 
// target arp_IPD, arp_MACD and Eth_MACD 
Step1:  
send ARP_Request_Message (ARP Header, Ethernet Header);  //opcode=1 
Step 2:         /*At D*/ 
 packet analysis();// checking for opcode==1 
 Decode_the _packet(); 
Step 3:  
if (arp_MACA==Eth_MACA) then 
 Update_arp_cache(); 
 send_ARP_Reply_Message (ARP Header, Ethernet Header); //opcode=2 
else 
 Store the forged IP- MAC_address into fake_list; 
  send alert message to the_Router or gateway;//opcode=26   
 if(arp_IPA and arp_MACA already exists in fake_list)  
  send Broadcast_Alert_Message;//opcode=25 
Step 4:         /*At A*/  
// sender arp_IPD, arp_MACD and Eth_MACD 
 //target arp_IPA,arp_MACA and Eth_MACA 
 Repeat Step 2 and Step 3; 
Step 5: Clear the ARP-Cache for every 10 minutes 
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cross-layer checking, non-cryptographic still it incurs some of the attacks caused through IP 
spoofing and router poisoning. The proposed can withstand ARP cache poisoning attacks like 
MiTM, DoS, host impersonation, cloning to some extent but attacks caused by ARP scanning and 
forging still pertains. The problems with gratuitous ARP requests yet to be covered. 
 
The proposed algorithm is simulated as follows: Three nodes viz., A with IP-MAC pair 
192.169.1.10-00:5:79:66:68:01, B with IP-MAC pair 192.169.1.11-00:5:79:66:68:02 and C with 
IP-MAC pair 192.169.1.12 -00:05:79:66:68:03. 
 
Table 1. Comparison with Existing solutions 
 
 
The proposed algorithm detects the following type of packets: 
 
PKT#1. (MACVAL,IPINV)  in ARP Request(Destination) 
PKT#2. (MACINV,IPVAL) in ARP Request(Source) 
PKT#3. (MACVAL,IPINV)  [This situation may even happen when the hosts are assigned IP 
dynamically] 
PKT#4. (MACINV,IPVAL) in ARP Reply(Destination) 
PKT#5. (MACVAL,IPINV)  in ARP Reply (Source) 
PKT#6. (MACVAL,IPINV)  in ARP Reply during the dynamic assignment 
PKT#7. (MACINV,IPVAL) in Broadcast Alert Message 
PKT#8. Null MAC Address in Broadcast Alert Message 
PKT#9. (MACINV,IPVAL) in Unicast Alert message (Source) 
PKT#10. (MACVAL,IPINV) in Unicast Alert message  (Destination) 
PKT#11. (MACVAL,IPINV) in Unicast Alert Message (Source) 
 
MACINV Invalid MAC Address 
IPINV Invalid IP Address 
MACVAL Valid MAC Address 
IPVAL Valid IP Address 
NULL  Null MAC address which is non-existent 
 
Table 2 below provides the details about the possible packets that the proposed system detects. 
These packets, when detected, can avoid DoS, MiTM, and host impersonation to some extent. 
Features RFC8
26 
SARP TARP EAR
P  
GARP Central 
Server  
Proposed 
Cross Layer 
Inspection 
No No No No No No Yes 
ARP Stateful No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ARP storm 
Prevention 
No No Partial
* 
Yes Yes Yes Partial 
Static-S and 
Dynamic-D 
entries 
S&D D D S&D S&D S&D S&D 
Cryptographi
c 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
* leads to ticket flooding attack 
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Though the proposed system can able to detect these packets, still the same problem persists with 
this ARP viz., a host will still receive a reply for an unsent request. The fake list table used here is 
never cleared so that the entries may provide expired details, and it may leave the network in 
chaos. The fake list table may grow larger in an attack situation, which may consume larger 
storage. This situation may lead to some new attacks as well. The replay attacks are not tracked up, 
which can be avoided to some extent only.  
 
However, the packets PKT#1, PKT#7 and PKT#8 can be detected only if the request or reply 
received before cache clearance or it has a static entry of the devices in the network. 
 
However, the packets PKT#1, PKT#7 and PKT#8 can be detected only if the request or reply 
received before cache clearance or it has a static entry of the devices in the network. 
 
Table 2. Packets that proposed algorithm detects 
 
Packet 
No 
Detection 
Situation 
Source / 
Destination 
Packet type The feature 
that does 
this  
Sample 
AT B, Assume Host A wants to communicate with host B 
PKT#1 Only if the 
victim 
received the 
request 
before cache 
clearance of 
its previous 
entry  
Destination 
host 
ARP 
Request 
Cache entry 
checking  
and Fake 
list entry 
ARP_EntryA in B: 
192.169.1.10 
ARP_IPA:  
192.169.1.17 
(100% detection if 
entry is in the fake 
list even after cache 
clearance) 
PKT#2 When ARP-
MAC does 
not match 
with 
ETH_MAC 
Source host ARP 
Request 
Cross-Layer 
checking 
ARP_MACA: 
00:5:79:66:68:12 
ETH_MACA 
00:5:79:66:63:01 
PKT#3 Victim 
detects its IP 
is wrong 
Source host ARP 
Request 
ARP cache 
entry 
checking 
ARP_IPB:  
192.169.1.11 
ARP_Source: 
192.169.3.23 
 
 
AT A, Assume Host B in the process of Accepting ARP Requests from A 
PKT#4 When Eth-
MAC and 
ARP_MAC 
does not 
match 
Destination 
host 
ARP Reply Cross-layer 
checking 
ARP_MACA: 
00:5:79:66:68:12 
ETH_MACA 
00:5:79:66:63:01 
PKT#5 If the victim 
received the 
reply with 
spoofed IP  
Destination 
host 
ARP Reply Cache entry 
checking  
and Fake 
list entry 
ARP_IPA:  
192.169.1.10 
ARP_Source: 
192.169.3.26 
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PKT#6 Victim 
detects its IP 
is wrong 
Source host ARP Reply On 
reception of 
ARP packet 
and Entry 
checking 
B’s IP:  
192.169.1.11 
ARP_IPB:  
192.169.1.18 
 
Assume A sends a Broadcast message  
PKT#7 All the host 
in the 
network can 
detect from 
its static 
ARP entry  
Source host Broadcast 
Alert 
Message 
Cross-layer 
checking 
ARP_MACA: 
00:5:79:66:68:AF 
ETH_MACA 
00:5:79:66:63:01 
PKT#8 All the host 
in the 
network can 
detect from 
its static 
ARP entry 
Source host Broadcast 
Alert 
Message 
Cross-layer 
checking 
ARP_MACA:  
00:00:00:00:00:00 
ETH_MACA 
00:5:79:66:63:01 
An Alert message from host A to Router (At Router) 
PKT#9 When the 
ARP_MAC 
and 
ETH_MAC 
does not 
match 
Source host Unicast 
Alert 
Message 
Cross-Layer 
checking 
ARP_MACA:  
00:06:80:99:80:00 
ETH_MACA 
00:5:79:66:63:01 
PKT#10 When the 
Router’s IP 
does not 
match 
Destination 
host 
Unicast 
Alert 
Message 
On message 
reception 
ARP_IP of Router: 
10.10.1.1 
Router’s IP: 
10.10.1.0 
PKT#11 When 
ARP_IPA 
does not 
match with 
Router’s 
ARP cache 
Source host Unicast 
Alert 
Message 
ARP cache 
checking 
ARP_IPA: 
192.169.1.17 
ARP_IPA in 
router’s cache 
192.169.1.10 
 
The traditional ARP system is vulnerable to the following type of attacks: MitM attack, DoS, 
hijacking connections through sniffing, making clones or impersonating the hosts, spoofing IP and 
MAC addresses, IP conflict attack, ARP request/reply flooding and replay attack. 
 
Of the attacks specified the proposed algorithm can mitigate following types of attacks as follows: 
The man-in-the-middle attack that is caused by IP-spoofing and MAC-spoofing can be avoided. 
The algorithm encounters these two cases by cross-layer checking and fake-list updation. But IP-
spoofing may still prevail in case of dynamic IP configuration, as fake list entry clearance is not 
done. This eventually leads to denial of service attacks, which will be consuming all the network 
resources of the victim. In turn, the legitimate users of the network are starved.  
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The tremendous form of DoS is distributed-DoS, where they can compromise the network 
resources faster than the DoS by making various compromised hosts to flood the network with 
unsolicited messages.  
 
The cloning of host will be mitigated by cross-layer checking, as hosts in the LAN can 
communicate via MAC addresses only. Though MAC spoofing will be mitigated, IP spoofing may 
still exist. Since the proposed algorithm does not bother about timely delivery of ARP messages 
replay attack will be sustained by which attack tries to bombard the network by sending the same 
packets again and again until the network is frustrating. 
 
The graph in Figure 16 depicts how the packet detection rate in comparison with other systems. 
The proposed algorithm is compared with ARP [33], TARP [35], EARP [36], GARP [37] and 
Centralized Approach [38]. It’s been clear that the proposed algorithm performs better than all the 
techniques. The following formula obtains the packet detection rate:  
 
PDR(%) = #APD / #TMP    …………………..                         Eqn.1 
 
Where PDRPacket Detection Rate; #APDNumber of Abnormal packets detected #TMP 
Total number of abnormal packets sent. The PDR of CLCC and RFC 826 is given in Table 3. 
 
Table 3.  Comparison of CLCC with RFC826 
 
ARP 
Technique
s 
Total number of Packets injected No. of malicious 
packets 
detected 
Detecti
on 
Rate 
*Normal 
Packets 
**Abnormal 
Packets 
RFC 826 100 1155 115 12 
CLCC 100 1155 892 77 
*Normal PacketsNormal ARP Request Reply packets 
**Abnormal Packets PKT#1 to PKT#11 
 
The graph is obtained by analysing the systems with various type of packets listed in Table 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Graphical analysis of proposed with existing systems 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
A broad study on content sniffing and ARP sniffing attacks were conducted. A lattice structure 
obtained guarantees that sniffing activity causes DoS or DDoS attacks. This lattice model will 
help to ensure that any detection mechanism for a DDoS attack can combat all the attacks 
mentioned in the model. Also, the proposed ARP mitigation techniques prove that ARP - sniffing 
causes the DoS or DDoS attack, and this system mitigates it by cross-layer checks and fake list 
updation. The mitigation technique proves that ARP sniffing causes the DoS or DDoS attack, and 
this system mitigates it by cross-layer checks and fake list updation. This technique avoids host 
impersonation, DoS attacks and MiTM attacks caused by ARP cache poisoning. Since it clears 
the cache every 10mins, the ARP table has to be updated each time a new host communicates in 
the network. Though this can be a loophole for the attackers, the checking of Ethernet header 
information with ARP header information, they will go vain without any information being 
retrieved. This will be an authenticated method which avoids most of the attacks by cache 
poisoning. 
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